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CHANGING CONCEPTS OF CONTROL OF
THE ARMED FORCES
By THE HON. JOHN SPARKMAN
United States Senator from Alabama

A UCH of the constitutional history of the United States is concerned with a
continuing dispute as to the precise lines which separate the powers of the
three branches of government. This has especially been the case with regard
to the powers of the President and of Congress and nowhere more so than in
the field of foreign policy and the control of the armed forces.
The lines between these two branches of government have shifted back and
forth, depending upon the times, the nature of the President, and the assertiveness of Congress. Strong Presidents, especially in times of stress and crisis,
have shifted the balance of power toward the executive branch. Self-assertive,
even aggressive, Congresses, especially during the administrations of weak
Presidents, have shifted the balance back toward the legislative branch. In
this continuing ebb and flow, both the President and the Congress have found
able and learned advocates among the professional students of the subject.
Usually, the point in controversy has been whether a particular power in
a particular set of circumstances properly belongs to the President or the Congress. Except for occasional advocates of the parliamentary system of government, there have been few serious suggestions that the problem be solved by
merging the powers of those two branches of Government.
This is one of the more important aspects of the debate which occupied the
Senate during the early months of 1957 in regard to the Middle East.
After having first come to Congressional and public notice unofficially but
authoritatively in the press,' the President's doctrine for the Middle East was
formally presented to a joint session of Congress on January 5, 1957.2
The action which the President requested of Congress consisted of three
elements:
1. A restatement of the President's authority, under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended," to extend economic and military assistance
to nations in the general area of the Middle East.

I The

New York Times, Dec. 28, 1956, p. 1.
United States Congress. House of Representatives. Middle East Situation. Address of the
President of the United States. H. Doc. 46, 85th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 5, 1957.
a Public Law 665, 83rd Cong., as amended by Public Law 138 and Public Law 726, 84th Cong.
2

[335)

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61

2. Authority for the President, when he determined it to be important
to the security of the United States, to use up to $200 million of available
mutual security appropriations for these purposes without regard to the
provisions of any other law.
3. A statement that the President "is authorized to employ the Armed
Forces of the United States as he deems necessary to secure and protect the
territorial integrity and political independence of any such [i.e., Middle
East] nation or group of nations requesting such aid against overt armed
aggression from any nation controlled by international communism .......
The first of these provisions was essentially no more than a restatement of
existing law. The second did not involve additional appropriations, but only
the manner of spending existing appropriations. The third was by far the
most important and significant.
As a precedent for its request concerning authority to use the armed forces,
the Administration cited the somewhat similar Congressional action relating to
Formosa and the Pescadores in 1955.5 Although the Formosa resolution passed
the Senate with only three dissenting votes, some of those who voted for it raised
the question of whether it was sound constitutional practice from the point of
view of preserving intact the powers of the President.'
These doubts were renewed and strengthened by the President's request in
regard to the Middle East. As consideration of the Middle East resolution
proceeded, however, it became apparent that what was involved here was not
merely the preservation of the powers of the President, but likewise the preservation of the powers of Congress. The great difficulty of the resolution, from
a constitutional point of view held by many, was that it improperly commingled
the powers of the two branches of government and blurred the line of separation.
On the one hand, the specific authorization requested by the President
raised doubt that the President, acting alone, had the constitutional authority to
do what he deemed necessary to protect the vital interests of the United
States. This doubt was raised by the mere fact that the President had asked to
be "authorized". The act of asking implied that the President himself felt that
he did not have such authority. The doubt would have been compounded many
times if Congress had concurred in the President's view.
4H.J. Res. 117, 85th Cong., print of Jan. 5, 1957.
5 Public Law 4, 84th Cong.
6 See Congressional Record, Senate Debates, Jan. 27 and 28, 1955.
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The President's action also raised the question, under the principle of
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, as to whether American reaction to Soviet
armed aggression would be limited to the areas and the circumstances for which
there existed specific Congressional authority-namely, as to areas, Formosa
and the Pescadores, under the resolution of 1955 and the Middle East under the
proposed resolution of 1957.
Thus the Middle East resolution, particularly when considered alongside
the Formosa resolution, called into question the power of the President and
represented a diminution of that power. To the same extent, it represented an
augmentation of the power of Congress.
On the other hand, the specific language requested by the President would
have given him authority extending in some respects beyond what is properly
his under the Constitution. It would have authorized his use of armed forces,
not simply to meet a specific emergency endangering the United States, but to
defend any nation in the general area of the Middle East which requested such
aid against overt armed aggression by a country controlled by international
communism. There were provisos referring to U. S. treaty obligations and particularly to the Charter of the United Nations, but in practical effect the authorization was unlimited in time or in the scale of action which could be undertaken, and was not explicitly tied to the security of the United States. It was,
as the late Senator Barkley observed of the Formosa resolution, "a pre-dated
declaration of war." It could just as well have been called a contingent declaration of war. It seemed to some degree to foreclose Congress from exercising
any check upon the President if the time ever came when he used the authority
conferred upon him. It could be argued that Congress was thus being asked to
exercise its authority improperly-i.e., not on a case-by-case basis. In this way,
therefore, the resolution represented an augmentation of the powers of the
President and a diminution of the powers of Congress.
The resolution, as presented by the Administration, also tended to disturb
the proper constitutional relationships between the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Historically, when the United States has wanted to throw a
mantle of protection over a given area of the world, it has proceeded in one of
two ways.
The President, on his own authority, has proclaimed such to be the policy
of the United States, as in the case of the Monroe Doctrine.
Or, the United States has made treaties, negotiated and ratified by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The North Atlantic Treaty
is a good example.
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In the situation which prevailed in the Middle East during late 1956 and
early 1957, a treaty offered a clear alternative to the course of action which the
President chose. For reasons which seemed to the President good and sufficient,
and which are not questioned here, the treaty method was discarded. In lieu
of a treaty, however, and in lieu, also, of a simple Presidential declaration of policy, the Congress as a whole was asked to pass a law. In this sense, and to this
extent, therefore, the treaty-making power of the Senate was by-passed and the
role of the House correspondingly increased. It should be noted in this respect
that the Constitutional provision for a two-thirds vote on treaties in the Senate
is also being by-passed in favor of a simple majority vote in each house.
The reasons for not proceeding through a treaty, however, did not rule
out an approach through a policy declaration by the President. There was
ample precedent for this approach, not only in regard to other policies, going
back to the Monroe Doctrine, but also in regard to the current situation in the
Middle East.
As early as April 3, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had asserted
that United States forces might be utilized in the Middle East without congressional authority in the event of an emergency-although he said at the same
time that he was unaware of any situation which would require such emergency
action.'
Six days later, on April 9, a statement released by Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty pledged the United States to oppose aggression in the Middle East within constitutional means and to assist the victims of aggression.'
On October 16, Secretary Dulles reaffirmed the determination of the United
States "within constitutional means" to support and assist any victim of aggression in the Middle East.' On October 29, following the Israeli attack on
Egypt, a Presidential statement in Washington declared that "we shall honor
our pledge" to "assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East." 10 Two
days later, however, the President stated that the United States would not become involved in the Middle East hostilities, 1 and on November 1, it was indicated that United States action in the Middle East hostilities would be limited
to an appeal to the United Nations General Assembly, with the aim of localizing the fighting."2 On November 14, President Eisenhower stated that the
United States would oppose through the United Nations any Soviet military
Department of State Bulletin, April 16, 1956, Vol. 34, No. 877, pp. 641-643.
8 The New York Times, April 10, 1956, p. 1.
9 Department of State Press Release No. 542, Oct. 16, 1956.
10 White House Press Release, Oct. 29, 1956. Statement by James C. Hagerty.
11 The New York Times, Nov. 1, 1956, p. 14.
12 See: United Nations, General Assembly, Document A/3256.
7
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intervention in the Middle East,'8 and on November 16, the United States
again warned the Soviet Union against sending Soviet "volunteers" to the
area.' 4 On November 29, the Department of State issued a statement reaffirming its support of the Baghdad Pact (Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom) and warning that a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of members of the pact would be viewed by the United States with
the utmost gravity." On December 4, the United States reportedly informed
Syria that it would tolerate no more aggression in the Middle East.'"
These several official statements are recited to show that the executive
branch had made it abundantly clear that the United States would take all
measures necessary, including the use of force, to repel Communist aggression
in the Middle East. This position was, of course, weakened somewhat by the
statements of October 31 and November 1 that the United States would not become involved in Middle East hostilities and that its action would be limited to
an appeal to the United Nations General Assembly, with the aim of localizing
the fighting. It could reasonably be argued, however, that these particular
statements referred to the specific situation then existing, as among Egypt,
Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, and that they had no bearing on what
the reaction of the United States would be to Communist intervention. In this
connection, it is important to note that these particular statements were made
before the first offers of Soviet and Chinese Communist assistance to Egypt on
November 3.
The President obviously felt, however, that, notwithstanding these repeated and authoritative statements of the grave view which the United States
would take of Communist aggression in the Middle East, something more was
needed. This something more could very well have been supplied by the insertion of a few appropriate paragraphs in the President's State of the Union
message to Congress. If it was felt that even this would have been insufficient,
then it could have been followed up and strengthened in the form either of a
simple Senate resolution or of a concurrent Congressional resolution, neither
of which requires the President's signature or has the force of law. Such a
resolution would merely have expressed the "sense" of the Senate, or of Congress, as to what the policy of the United States in the Middle East should be.
It would have been an indication of Congressional support of the President's
policy, and it would have avoided all the troublesome constitutional questions
raised by the joint resolution which the President proposed.
13 The New York Times, Nov. 15, 1956, p. 26.
14 Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 26, 1956, Vol. 35, No. 909, p. 836.
5 The New York Times, Nov. 30, 1956, p. 1.
16 The New York Times, Dec. 5, 1956.
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Ample precedent for this procedure exists. To cite but three examples:
During the war, the Fulbright resolution in the House 1 7 and the Connally resolution in the Senate 8 indicated Congressional willingness to support the United
Nations after the war. In 1948, the Vandenburg"' resolution indicated Senate
willingness to ratify the North Atlantic Treaty. And in 1951, the ConnallyRussell resolution 20 expressed Senate agreement with the President's action in
sending American troops to Europe.
It seems entirely unreasonable to suppose that a procedure such as that
suggested would have left any real doubt in the Kremlin or elsewhere as to
what the United States would do if communism did commit armed aggression
in the Middle East. On the contrary, such a procedure would have had the
very great virtue of not creating doubt, both in the United States and abroad,
as to what action the President could properly take in the case of some emergency direly threatening the United States in some other part of the world at
some unknown future date.
The resolution as originally proposed by the President did create such
doubt, and that was one of its disadvantages. It seems useful, therefore, to attempt some clarification of this question of the relative powers and the proper
functions of the President and of Congress in connection with the use of the
armed forces.
Whatever may be the relative powers of the executive and legislative
branches in this field, it is certain that powers adequate to national defense reside in the two branches taken together. This is doubtless the consideration
that moved the President to ask for the resolution in the form in which he did
ask for it. This consideration, however, can be adequately met, as it has been
many times in the past, through other means.
Situations so threatening to the security of the United States as to require
the use of American armed forces in combat may conveniently be divided, for
consideration of their constitutional aspects, into two categories: (1) those in
which time permits joint action by the President and Congress; and (2) those
which are of such extreme urgency that time does not permit congressional participation in the initial action.
. In situations in the first category, the appropriate constitutional procedure
is for the President to come to Congress and seek a declaration of war or other
appropriate authority. The problem is frequently raised of the power of the
17

House Concurrent Resolution 25, 78th Cong.

18 Senate Resolution 192, 78th Cong.

19 Senate Resolution 239, 80th Cong.
Senate Resolution 99, 82d Cong.

20
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President to take warlike actions, either through the disposition of troops, or
other means, without prior Congressional approval, and thereby to precipitate
a crisis in which Congress has no real freedom of action. This problem, I suggest, is more theoretical than practical. It goes more to the wisdom than the
powers of a President. Many Presidents have used their powers to deploy the
armed forces, for example, in a way which made the forces more subject to
attack. The wisdom of these actions has sometimes been questioned, but so
far as I am aware there has been no serious challenge of the constitutionality.
The line is admittedly a fine one, but I do not believe the President needs
advance Congressional authority to take defensive measures of this character.
President Wilson, for example, armed merchant ships after a Senate filibuster
had killed a bill authorizing him to do so. President Franklin Roosevelt not
only armed merchant ships without even asking Congress for authority but also
issued a "shoot-on-sight" order and sent Army units to Iceland. But it was
perhaps President Lincoln who went further than any of our other Presidents
in stretching the powers of his office. All of this is not to say, however, that
circumstances might not arise in which the President, without Congressional
authority, could take steps which would result in a clear and present danger of
involvement in war.
In situations in the second category listed above, the appropriate constitutional procedure is for the President to take whatever action he deems the
circumstances require and then to come to Congress for a declaration of war or
for whatever other legislative sanction may be indicated.
This writer supported President Truman's intervention in Korea in 1950,
and is still of the opinion that this action was in the vital interests of the
United States. But the writer is also of the opinion, with the benefit of hindsight, that immediately following the Korean intervention, President Truman
should have come to Congress for approval of his action. There is no doubt
that such approval would have been promptly forthcoming. Further, Congressional approval would have cut the ground from under much of the criticism
which was subsequently voiced.
One of the major objections to the formula which was used in the Formosa
resolution in 1955 and which was proposed in the Middle East resolution in
1957 is that it tends to create a precedent and when repeated tends to strengthen
that precedent. Precedents of this character tend to weaken the power of the
President to act in other situations while at the same time they tend to
strengthen unduly his authority in the situation specifically dealt with.
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This is a question of correct institutional relationships between Congress
and the Office of the President. It is of the first importance that these correct
relationships be preserved, because this particular field-the use of armed forces
-is one which, except rarely, and long after the event, is not subject to judicial
review. For practical purposes, the government of the United States, in regard to this question, is a bipartite, rather than a tripartite, government.
This fact makes it all the more important that both the President and
Congress proceed with the greatest care; because the absence of a practical
judicial check upon their actions means that the only real checks are those which
they themselves exercise.
* In the final form in which it was approved by Congress, the resolution on
the Middle East was far superior to the original text requested by the President. This statement applies to all aspects of the resolution, but the discussion
here will be limited to the constitutional aspects regarding the use of troops.
For purposes of comparison, the relevant texts are as follows:
As requested by the President:
"Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general
area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or
group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, he is
authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems
necessary to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any such nation or group of nations requesting such aid
against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international
communism: Provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the
treaty obligations of the United States and with the Charter of the United
Nations and actions and recommendations of the United Nations; and,
as specified in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, measures pursuant thereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security." i
As passed by Congress:
"Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general
area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation
or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore,
the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace
21 Senate Joint Resolution 19, 85th Cong.

CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

1957.]

the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the
Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such
nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed
aggression from any country controlled by international communism:
Provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United
States." 22
There are two key differences. First, the resolution as passed by Congress predicates the use of armed forces upon a finding that the independence
and integrity of the nations of the Middle East are vital to the national interest.
There was no such finding in the text proposed by the President, though it
was, perhaps, implicit. Whatever the President's powers as Commander-inChief, they certainly do not extend to employment of the armed forces, without
the express authorization of Congress, in situations in which the vital interest
of the United States is not at stake.
Second, whereas the President had asked that he be "authorized" to employ
the armed forces, the resolution as passed stated that "the United States is
prepared to use armed forces." Thus, instead of muddying the constitutional
waters, Congress in effect adopted the approach suggested above-i.e., a simple statement of the policy of the United States, concurred in by both the
President and Congress. The advantages of this approach are aptly put in the
report of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services,
which considered the resolution jointly:
"This language has the virtue of remaining silent on the question
of the relationship between the Congress and the President with respect
to the use of the Armed Forces for the objectives stated in the resolution.
"At the same time this formulation makes clear the importance
which the United States attaches to the Middle East and the determination
of the United States to use armed force to resist Communist aggression in
the area should any nation request such assistance.
"The joint committee rejects the idea that, because the agreed language
does not deal with the question of the scope of the President's authority,
the language therefore may indicate a weakening of United States determination." 23
22
23

Public Law 85-7.
Senate Report 70, 85th Cong., p. 9.
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It is, of course, necessary that there be the closest cooperation between the
executive and legislative branches in these matters which may affect the very
survival of the United States. But this kind of cooperation can be had without
improper intermingling of their respective functions.
In the two months during which the Senate considered the President's
Middle East resolution, the traditional relationships between the President and
Congress were revived and reaffirmed. A useful, instead of a damaging, precedent was set. This result alone is enough to justify the statement that during the
two months of January and February, 1957, the Senate performed a notable
public service.

